A growing body of research demonstrates the many benefits of expanded public coverage for children. Expansions in Medicaid and the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) have helped to increase insurance coverage, increase access to care, and reduce the financial burdens facing low-income families. Less attention has been focused on the cost of expanding public coverage. We argue that budgetary data may exaggerate the net costs of these expansions because many of the highest-cost children would have received publicly funded care even if the expansions had not taken place. Using data from the 2000 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, we simulate the net cost of SCHIP, finding that the true cost of this program-both to states and to the federal government-is substantially less than average spending per enrollee would suggest. Our results strengthen the benefit-cost argument against implementing rollbacks in SCHIP.
State and federal governments have worked together since the late 1980s to achieve major increases in public health insurance for children in low-income families through expansions in Medicaid eligibility and implementation of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP). These expansions in coverage have yielded numerous benefits, including increased insurance coverage, greater access to care, and reduced financial burdens. Recently, however, federal and state governments have come under intense pressure to reduce expenditures, and the combination of reduced federal SCHIP allocations and high SCHIP enrollment has led a number of states to begin reversing the expansion in public coverage for children. Several states have closed SCHIP to new enrollees, while others have scaled back eligibility thresholds and implemented a variety of impediments to enrollment. Further cutbacks are being debated in state capitals across the country, and federal SCHIP legislation soon will be up for reauthorization.
Sound policymaking regarding the financing of health care for children requires accurate estimates of both the benefits and the costs of public coverage. Numerous papers help demonstrate the benefits of SCHIP, whereas less attention has been paid to estimating the cost of SCHIP. We argue in this paper that budgetary data on average spending per enrollee exaggerate the true costs of SCHIP -and thereby exaggerate the savings that might be achieved from SCHIP rollbacks. 1 Many of the highest-cost SCHIP enrollees would have received publicly funded care even in that Thomas M. Selden, Ph.D., and Julie L. Hudson, Ph.D. , are economists at the Center for Financing, Access, and Cost Trends, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Address correspondence to Dr. Selden at Center for Financing, Access, and Cost Trends, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 540 Gaither Road, Rockville, MD 20850. Email: tselden@AHRQ.gov program's absence. 2 In many states, high-expenditure children can spend down to Medicaid medically needy eligibility. Alternatively, highexpenditure children may obtain publicly funded free care through public hospitals and clinics, and families with uninsured children are disproportionately likely to have uncompensated care. Of course, some children might have held private coverage had the public expansions not occurred (''crowd-out'') . Even these children would have received public subsidies in the absence of SCHIP because employment-related health insurance premiums are tax preferred. For these reasons, the true net cost of SCHIP may be substantially less than is generally believed. Whereas it is easy to calculate the average cost per enrollee using budgetary data, assessing the net cost of SCHIP is complicated by the need to compare public expenditures in the presence of SCHIP with public expenditures in that program's absence. Using data from the 2000 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), we examine medical expenditures for SCHIP enrollees and then simulate what their expenditures would have been absent SCHIP. We track changes in state, federal, and national spending, thereby providing insights into the net cost of SCHIP -and the savings that might be realized from reductions in enrollment. In addition to our base-case simulation, we examine the sensitivity of our results to key assumptions of the model.
Background
The 1997 Balanced Budget Act created SCHIP, providing states with capped federal subsidies to cover low-income uninsured children. Prior to SCHIP, the federal government mandated Medicaid coverage for children born after September 30, 1983 , with family incomes up to 100% of federal poverty guidelines (FPG) and for children under age 6 with family incomes below 133% of FPG. Although many states had exceeded these federal mandates by offering Medicaid coverage to older or higher-income children, SCHIP represented a large expansion in eligibility for public coverage, with many states setting eligibility thresholds at 200% of FPG or above. By 2000, the year of our study, there were 3.3 million children enrolled in SCHIP at some time during the year, and by 2002 this number had risen to 5.3 million (CMS 2001 (CMS , 2003 .
Expanded eligibility for public coverage has conferred important benefits on children and their families. Previous literature has found evidence of increased access to care, increased preventive care, reduced infant mortality, and decreased family financial burdens. 3 Although SCHIP remains a tremendously popular program, severe fiscal pressures have led many states to increase premiums, cap enrollment, reduce eligibility thresholds, and implement other SCHIP changes that might cause reductions in enrollment (see, for instance, Ross and Cox 2003; Hill, Stockdale, and Courtot 2004; and Smith, Rousseau, and O'Malley 2004) . There are also concerns about caps on federal spending and about the upcoming federal SCHIP reauthorization (Park and Broaddus 2002) . To assess the wisdom of SCHIP rollbacks would require a detailed cost-benefit calculation that is beyond the scope of the present paper. Rather, our focus is on the narrower question of how much SCHIP really costs states and the federal government-and how much they can really expect to save from reductions in SCHIP enrollment.
Simulating the Net Cost of SCHIP
It is straightforward to compute the cost of SCHIP as total program spending divided by the number of enrollees. This ''budgetary'' approach, however, ignores the possibility that spending on other programs would be higher in the absence of SCHIP. To assess the net cost of SCHIP, we simulate what spending would be in a scenario where we eliminate SCHIP entirely. Of course, this is not what states are currently contemplating; however, this approach provides insights into SCHIP's overall net cost. We discuss later how the rollback policies that some states are implementing (e.g., changing eligibility thresholds and capping enrollment) might have different impacts. Figure 1 provides a schematic overview of our simulation. The left side presents our starting point, consisting of children enrolled in SCHIP. Using data from the 2000 MEPS, we identify SCHIP enrollees as children with public coverage who meet the SCHIP eligibility criteria. MEPS provides us with data on these children's coverage, utilization, and expenditures in the presence of SCHIP.
The right side of Figure 1 presents our simulation of public costs in the absence of SCHIP. We begin by simulating the percentage of children who would have private coverage versus the percentage who would become uninsured. Among children becoming uninsured, we estimate two potential cost offsets: 1) increased Medicaid spending as some uninsured children with high costs spend down to eligibility for Medicaid medically needy coverage; and 2) increased uncompensated care that may in part be publicly funded. Among children becoming privately insured we also calculate: 3) increased tax subsidies to employment-related coverage (a decline in tax revenue). The objective of our paper is to assess the extent to which these three offsets reduce the net cost of SCHIP -thereby providing insights regarding the extent to which a simple budgetary calculation would exaggerate the savings that might be achieved from SCHIP rollbacks. 4
Medicaid Medically Needy Offset
Absent SCHIP, some enrollees would have private coverage; however, our base-case assumption is that 85% would be uninsured. 5 Among these uninsured children, a few would likely have expenditures high enough that they would spend down to eligibility for medically needy coverage. To simulate medically needy spend down, we apply state-by-state Medicaid rules, allowing for the possibility of incomplete Medicaid takeup among qualifying children. 6 Our base case assumes the medically needy take-up rate to be 70%. 7 Our simulation accounts for the fact that medically needy expenditures are subsidized by the federal government at the Medicaid matching rate, rather than the higher SCHIP matching rate. Among those children receiving medically needy coverage, Medicaid is assumed to pay all amounts over the medically needy threshold. We are careful to account for the decline in utilization that likely would occur prior to the child reaching this threshold. 8 To do so, we employ Marquis's (1992) approximation of the demand response in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE). 9
Uncompensated Care Offset
Among uninsured children not receiving medically needy coverage, some care likely would be uncompensated. To simulate the extent of uncompensated care, we use MEPS data from 1997 (prior to the start of SCHIP) for children in the income range subsequently targeted by SCHIP. MEPS collects data on both actual payments and ''full established'' charges. Even for insured children, payments are usually less than charges (due to negotiated discounts). In some cases, however, there is little or no payment whatsoever. We identify uncompensated care as cases where payments as a share of charges are less than a third of the average payment-to-charge ratio among privately insured children. 10 Using 1997 data, we estimate a probit model for uncompensated care as a function of the following: the number and average ages of children in the family, race, ethnicity, family poverty level, self-rated health status among the family's children, and being in a family with a child who is hospitalized during the year (results available upon request). We apply these 1997 coefficient estimates to our 2000 data to predict the probability of having uncompensated care conditional on being uninsured in the absence of SCHIP. This approach allows the probability of having uncompensated care to be greatest among children in the poorest health and among children with hospitalizations. Conditional on having uncompensated care, we apply payment-to-charge ratios from our 1997 data to obtain dollar estimates of uncompensated care. Simulating uncompensated care in this manner helps us to capture differences between SCHIP enrollees in our 2000 sample and our 1997 sample of uninsured children who were subsequently targeted by SCHIP. In particular, this approach helps to control for the fact that SCHIP enrollees have substantially greater health problems than the typical child. 11 While it is reasonably straightforward to develop uncompensated care estimates in the absence of SCHIP, it is more difficult to determine the impact of uncompensated care on state and federal budgets. Health researchers are divided in their beliefs regarding the incidence of uncompensated care (Hadley and Holahan 2003) . The burden likely falls on both the private and public sectors. 12 In our simulation, we assume that states bear half of any increase in uncompensated care. 13 However, readers can readily adjust this percentage, increasing or decreasing the uncompensated care offsets we calculate to more closely mirror their beliefs regarding the incidence and financing of uncompensated care in specific states.
Tax Subsidies to Private Coverage -the Crowd-Out Offset
Our simulation allows for the possibility of ''crowd-out,'' whereby some SCHIP enrollees would hold private coverage in that program's absence. For simplicity, we assume that children with private coverage would generate no Medicaid medically needy or uncompensated care offsets. 14 These children, however, would receive public subsidies through the preferential tax treatment of employment-related private insurance. Put another way, in the United States the government subsidizes both public and private coverage, and it is the difference in these subsidies that matters in calculating the net cost of public coverage.
There is widespread disagreement in the literature regarding the extent of crowd-out from expanding public eligibility -and there is even less evidence regarding the reverse crowd-out rate at which private coverage would increase in response to a contraction in children's eligibility for public coverage. 15 At issue is the extent to which any SCHIP-induced changes in the private insurance market can be reversed. Our base-case assumption is that 15% of SCHIP enrollees would have private coverage absent SCHIP -in essence a 15% (reverse) crowd-out rate. Conditional on having private insurance, we simulate the associated tax subsidy under the assumption that employer health insurance costs are forward-shifted to workers in the form of lower wages. 16
Sensitivity Analysis
Any simulation of this complexity involves a number of important assumptions. To help gauge the sensitivity of our findings, we conducted an extensive analysis of alternative assumptions regarding the extent of (reverse) crowd-out, the responsiveness of demand to changes in coverage, the medically needy takeup rate, and the method we used for simulating medically needy spend-down.
Data and Eligibility Simulation
The data for our analysis come from the 2000 MEPS, supplemented with the 1997 MEPS (Cohen et al. 1996; Cohen 1997) . MEPS is a stratified and clustered random sample of households sponsored by the Agency for Healthcare Rolling Back SCHIP Research and Quality (AHRQ). MEPS, when combined with sample weights, is designed to yield nationally representative estimates of insurance coverage, medical expenditures, and a wide range of other health-related and socioeconomic characteristics.
Income and Assets
We construct a household measure of earned income using hourly wages and hours worked for all jobs held during the interview week for the first interview in 2000. 17 In contrast, we obtain unearned income from the full-year income section. We estimate assets by capitalizing interest and dividend income flows using the average rate of return on six-month certificates of deposit. 18
Health Insurance
MEPS collects information to construct monthby-month indicators for public and/or private coverage. MEPS does not attempt to distinguish between Medicaid and SCHIP (indeed, many SCHIP programs are Medicaid expansions). To identify our sample of SCHIP enrollees, we select children with public coverage whom we simulate to have been eligible for public coverage via SCHIP. The 2000 MEPS full-year file contains data for 7,710 children 18 or younger, of whom we identify 488 to be SCHIP enrollees -our population for analysis. The weighted total is 3.4 million enrollees at any point during the year. This is very close to administrative data that place SCHIP enrollment at 3.3 million at any point during fiscal year 2000 (CMS 2001) .
Expenditures
MEPS gathers data on medical expenditures for all household members during the calendar year. We observe actual payments, by source, as well as full established charges and imputed charges for care provided free of charge from public clinics or hospitals. Having both payments and charges greatly facilitates our simulation of shifting SCHIP enrollees from public to private insurance and from public coverage to being uninsured (as described previously).
Simulating Program Eligibility
We simulate Medicaid eligibility using the method described in Selden, Hudson, and Banthin (2004) . We use detailed state-by-state program rules to simulate eligibility for Section 1931 Med-icaid, Medicaid medically needy coverage, Medicaid waivers, Medicaid's (''Waxman'') expansions for low-income pregnant women and children, and SCHIP coverage through Medicaid and separate state programs. We apply programspecific and state-specific rules for: income disregards, net and gross income tests, asset tests, eligibility unit family composition, categorical eligibility, eligibility by age group, and eligibility of noncitizens by time of arrival in the United States and immigration status (including the availability of separate state-funded programs). 19 For SCHIP and Medicaid waiver coverage, we simulate monthly premiums, applying all family and annual ceilings on the maximum premium charged.
We also simulate administrative costs. In principle, one would like to account for all public expenditures on outreach, enrollment, and administration, as well as any administrative expenses by private carriers if the state contracts out a portion or all of SCHIP claims and benefit management. Also, we ideally would like to distinguish between the fixed costs of enrolling a child and the variable costs associated with providing benefits. Under SCHIP, states face a 10% ceiling for administrative costs that are eligible for federal matching funds. Based on discussions with individuals familiar with SCHIP, we assume that the fixed outreach and enrollment cost is $25 per SCHIP child, plus 4% of paid claims. 20 Although we simulate many of the potential pathways by which children might gain eligibility to coverage, it is worth highlighting a number of caveats. First, we do not simulate Medicaid continuation coverage, such as transitional coverage for children in families leaving welfare or Medicaid coverage for children in families whose incomes recently have risen to ineligible levels. Second, we do not simulate disabilityrelated Medicaid coverage that may extend to children in families with higher incomes. 21 Third, as with any such analysis, errors in the reporting of income and family composition may cause simulated eligibility to differ from the eligibility determination that would be made if an application actually were completed on the interview date.
Results
It is useful to begin by presenting annualized SCHIP expenditure estimates. Annualized estimates facilitate comparison to administrative benchmarks, which often are presented on a full-year or per-month basis. Total public expenditures for care paid by SCHIP were $1,126 per enrollee-year. 22 Adding $90 in simulated administrative cost and subtracting $38 in simulated premiums, we estimate total program expenditures to be $1,178 per enrollee-year (or $98 per month). This is very consistent with the SCHIP capitation rates reported by Holahan (2003) , helping to confirm that we have a reasonable baseline SCHIP enrollee expenditure distribution. 23 Note also that while our annualized estimate of SCHIP program expenditures is $1,178, in fact only 50.4% of SCHIP children hold public coverage the entire year (standard error [S.E.] ¼ 3.5). Children enrolled in SCHIP during 2000 only held that coverage an average of 9.3 months (S.E. ¼ .3), so that the annual SCHIP expenditure per child ever enrolled is only $878. In the remainder of our paper we focus on SCHIP expenditures for children who were ever enrolled in the program. Table 1 presents our base-case simulation. The top panel presents selected simulation results to help provide insights into the state, federal, and national SCHIP cost estimates in the bottom panel. Starting with estimated national SCHIP cost of $878, we begin by subtracting the (reverse) crowd-out offset. In the absence of SCHIP, we estimate that increased private employment-related coverage would lead to $54 in increased tax subsidies, offsetting approximately 6% of SCHIP's costs. This reflects the tax revenue loss of $.41 per tax-subsidized premium dollar in our data, combined with the higher loading and the higher payment-to-charge ratio in private coverage.
The largest offset involves Medicaid medically needy coverage. We simulate that the frequency of medically needy coverage in the absence of SCHIP would be 2%. Although relatively few children would receive this coverage, they are among the highest-cost children. As a result, we calculate medically needy offsets to be $275 per former SCHIP enrollee. If we subset to children not shifting to private coverage, this medically needy offset averages $324 per uninsured child.
We simulate that 6% of SCHIP enrollees would generate uncompensated care for at least a portion of their medical bills in the absence of SCHIP. While the frequency of uncompensated care is more than three times that of Medicaid medically needy coverage, the associated savings offset is far less, because medically needy children have higher costs on average in our simulation. Our estimate of uncompensated care is $104 per SCHIP enrollee. We assume that half of this amount ($52) would be funded by public sources within the state.
Combining these estimates, the net federal and state cost of SCHIP falls from $878 to $498 (a reduction of 43%). The offsets we calculate have an even larger percentage impact when viewed from the state perspective. Estimated state cost per enrollee is $282 before offsets. This is much lower than the federal cost of $596 before offsets, reflecting the generous federal SCHIP matching subsidy. From the state perspective, the most important offset is the increase in medically needy spending ($128) that would occur in the absence of SCHIP. This occurs in part because the federal matching rate for Medicaid is 58.1%, which is 12.6 percentage points less than the average SCHIP federal matching rate of 70.7%. The crowd-out offset is far less important to states than to the federal government because state marginal tax rates are typically much lower than federal marginal rates. Uncompensated care offsets an additional $52 of apparent state savings (with no federal offset, by construction). From the state perspective, the net cost of SCHIP drops from $282 to $97 -a two-thirds reduction. From the federal perspective, the net cost of SCHIP is $401 versus $596, which is a one-third reduction. It is noteworthy that this base-case simulation incorporates a 24.7% reduction in medical care utilization absent SCHIP. This reduction reflects the assumption that the RAND Health Insurance Experiment demand responses can be directly applied to SCHIP enrollees in our sample. This simulated reduction in utilization should be taken with ''a large grain of salt.'' Whereas the HIE model we use applies to the general population, our focus is on children in low-income families. Also, whereas the HIE adjustment pertains to changes in fee-for-service coverage, we are simulating a shift from managed care under SCHIP (in most cases) to being uninsured. In particular, our simulation may under-predict the potential rise in preventable hospitalizations and emergency room care that one might expect if preventive care were to decline by a large percentage (see, for instance, Friedman et al. 1999) . In this case, total utilization reductions would be smaller than we simulate -as would the net savings that the states and federal government might expect from SCHIP cuts. Table 2 presents the results of our sensitivity analysis. We consider a range of assumptions regarding reverse crowd-out, the responsiveness of demand to price changes, and medically needy spend-down. Changes in assumptions relative to the base-case simulation are highlighted in the top panel of Table 2 . Models A and B raise and lower the crowd-out rate. From the state perspective, higher crowd-out rates raise the net cost of SCHIP. Providing SCHIP to children who otherwise would have held private coverage is relatively expensive to states, because it is the uninsured who account for Medicaid medically needy and uncompensated care in our model. Nevertheless, even with a 50% crowd-out rate, the net state cost of SCHIP would still be only about half ($147) of what one might conclude from a budgetary analysis ($282). From the fed-eral perspective, increased crowd-out actually reduces the net cost of SCHIP because federal subsidies to private coverage in the absence of SCHIP would be larger than federal subsidies to uninsured children. In other words, state subsidies to private insurance are smaller than state costs of having these children go without coverage, whereas the reverse is true for the federal government. Combining the state and federal numbers, we see that from a national perspective crowd-out tends to reduce the net cost of providing a child with SCHIP coverage (although the magnitude of the estimated differences is not large). Note also that (reverse) crowd-out significantly mitigates the decline in medical care consumption that one would expect from removing SCHIP.
Sensitivity Analysis
Model C examines the impact of reducing demand responsiveness by one third. This tends to increase spend-down to Medicaid medically needy coverage, because medical care consumption is reduced less by the higher out-of-pocket costs that children would face absent SCHIP. The effect on the net cost of SCHIP, however, is not large.
The base case and Models A to C all assume that among children spending down to Medicaid medically needy eligibility, only 70% actually enroll in Medicaid. This is close to the overall Medicaid take-up rate among eligible children ; however, one might expect takeup to be higher among medically needy eligibles given the financial incentives for providers to secure Medicaid payment. Model D increases the medically needy take-up rate to 100%. As a result, net SCHIP cost falls to $61 per enrollee from the state perspective and $338 from the federal perspective. From a national perspective, the net cost of SCHIP is now less than half what one would conclude from a budgetary perspective.
Models E and F weaken the effect of Medicaid medically needy offsets in our simulation. The base case and Models A to D assume that expenditures for Medicaid medically needy spenddown are concentrated within a six-month window. In Model E, we assume that expenditures are evenly distributed throughout the year, thereby reducing the extent to which expenditures trigger Medicaid spend-down. The percentage of children spending down drops from 2.1% to 1.3%, with corresponding declines in the Medic-aid medically needy offsets (and small increases in uncompensated care). The net cost of SCHIP rises to $122 from the state perspective and $443 from the federal perspective. In Model F, we eliminate Medicaid medically needy coverage entirely (as in states without such programs). This causes the net cost of SCHIP to rise still further to $180 from the state perspective and $548 from the federal perspective. The effect of SCHIP on utilization is even larger in these The induction assumption determines the extent to which utilization falls in response to a reduction in coverage. Our base-case assumption mirrors the main results from the Rand Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) as implemented in Marquis (1992) . c The Medicaid medically needy take-up percentage captures the possibility that not all children who have spent down to their state's Medicaid medically needy thresholds will actually become enrolled in that program. Our base-case assumption is that medically needy take-up is approximately the same as the overall takeup rate in Medicaid among children. d Medicaid medically needy months captures our base-case assumption that expenditures are concentrated within a 6-month window (and that spend-down eligibility is calculated on that basis). Widening this window to 12 months effectively reduces the expenditures that qualify for Medicaid payment. In Simulation F we are basically ignoring medically needy spend-down (either because the takeup rate is zero or because there is no such program).
cases, however. Absent SCHIP, utilization would decline by 28% in Models E and F.
Enrollment Cuts at What Margin?
The results presented here are national averages for the children we identify as being enrolled in SCHIP. In practice, however, no states are contemplating the complete elimination of SCHIP. Instead, incremental rollbacks may reduce enrollment unevenly. For instance, reducing eligibility thresholds for family income will likely affect children with family incomes near the thresholds, whereas raising SCHIP premiums might affect disproportionately children in lowerincome families. Our sample size limits our ability to form group-specific net cost estimates. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the (reverse) crowd-out offset would be larger in response to an eligibility threshold reduction than a premium increase, whereas the reverse would be true for the Medicaid medically needy and uncompensated care offsets. The impact of SCHIP rollbacks also might vary across children with different health risks. For instance, if states increased premiums or reduced outreach expenditures, the children most likely to lose SCHIP coverage might well be those with the fewest medical needs. To explore this possibility, we re-estimated our simulation results assuming that enrollment changes occur only among children whose health status was reported by respondents to be ''excellent,'' ''very good, '' or ''good'' (not ''fair'' or ''poor'') . Not surprisingly, our estimates of SCHIP net cost on this margin are even lower than for the average SCHIP enrollee. The net state, federal, and national costs in this case are $46, $177, and $223, respectively (not shown). Clearly, if SCHIP rollbacks disproportionately affected relatively healthy children, the potential savings would be modest.
Discussion
Our simulations suggest that the potential savings from cutting SCHIP are substantially smaller than they might appear from a simple analysis of budgetary data. This is because children denied SCHIP would cause offsetting increases elsewhere in state and federal budgets. We consider three such offsets in our paper: increased Medicaid medically needy spending, increased tax subsidies to private insurance, and increased costs associated with uncompensated care. To test the sensitivity of our findings, we consider a wide range of alternative assumptions for key parameters in our model. Our results vary across specifications, highlighting the difficulty in obtaining accurate estimates of SCHIP's net cost. However, in all cases we reach the same basic conclusion: budgetary data greatly overstate the true net costs of SCHIP -thereby overstating the potential savings from SCHIP rollbacks that might reduce enrollment.
Our results show that the potential savings to states from reducing enrollment are likely to be particularly low. Net state savings may be only one-half to one-third what one might surmise based on state SCHIP spending per enrollee. In our base-case simulation, we estimate a state's annual average net cost of SCHIP to be only $97 per child ever enrolled versus $282 per child based on SCHIP spending per enrollee. This finding may be useful in guiding state decision making. SCHIP enjoys widespread support and its benefits to children are well-established. In the current state fiscal climate, it also may be important to recognize that these benefits entail less net state spending than is generally perceived. Note, however, that our results represent national averages, and the net cost of SCHIP for a specific group of children in a specific state may differ substantially from the estimates we present. For instance, in states that do not fund alternative programs to help finance safety-net care for children, the net cost of SCHIP might be substantially greater than our base-case estimates.
Understanding the net cost of SCHIP from the federal and national perspectives is also important given the looming caps on federal SCHIP funds and the upcoming federal SCHIP reauthorization. From a federal perspective, we estimate the net cost of SCHIP to be $401 per child ever enrolled versus $596 per child if one takes a budgetary perspective. Combining our federal and state estimates gives a national net SCHIP cost of $498 per child ever enrolled versus budgetary outlays of $878. From either perspective, SCHIP costs are far less than generally believed.
Absent SCHIP, most children with high health care needs in our simulation would have received care (albeit smaller amounts), and this care would have been financed either by other public pro-grams or by private cross-subsidies. One main effect of SCHIP has been to provide a federal and state funding stream for these high-need children, alleviating financial pressures on the children's families, states, local governments, and private providers, while also improving the quality of care these children receive. The net cost of regularizing the funding of this care has not been large. The other main effect of SCHIP has been to provide insurance to children with far fewer health care needs. Covering these healthy chil-dren also has been relatively inexpensive, with the main benefit being improved access to routine and preventive services. As we head toward SCHIP reauthorization, sound policymaking regarding financing of health care for children requires a careful consideration of SCHIP's benefits and costs. While that larger analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, our findings help clarify the importance of computing SCHIP's costs net of offsetting savings to other public programs.
1 Gordon and Selden (2001) make a similar argument regarding the net cost of the Medicaid expansions for children. 2 See, for instance, O'Brien and Mann (2003) . 3 See, for instance, Currie and Gruber (1996) , Gruber (1997) , Banthin and Selden (2003) , and the literature survey by O'Brien and Mann (2003) . 4 A potential offset that we do not consider involves the ''multiplier'' effect of federal inflows to state economies (see O'Brien and Mann 2003) . SCHIP may also have increased Medicaid enrollment by increasing awareness of public coverage among parents of Medicaid-eligible children. Selden, Hudson, and Banthin (2004) found rising Medicaid takeup following SCHIP implementation. Cuts in SCHIP might have the reverse effect, although any reductions in Medicaid enrollment likely would be concentrated among children with the fewest health care needs, leaving higher-cost children in the program. Additional simulation details are available upon request. 5 Because children have varying probabilities of being uninsured, we use MEPS data from 1997 (prior to SCHIP) to estimate a probit model for uninsurance as a function of the number and average ages of children in the family, race, ethnicity, family poverty level, self-rated health status among the family's children, and being in a two-parent family (results available upon request). We estimate this model using children in the income range subsequently targeted by SCHIP, and we use the estimated coefficients from 1997 to obtain predicted probabilities for our 2000 sample. We then normalize these predicted probabilities to achieve our target crowd-out rate of 15%. This approach controls for differences, such as those in poverty level and health, that might be correlated with expenditures and eligibility for medically needy spend-down. In practice, however, we obtain very similar results if we simply impose a uniform 85% uninsurance probability. We also considered controlling for whether or not a child had at least one parent with an offer of employment-related coverage through a current job. Having a parent with an offer is a strong predictor of private coverage, but it might be endogenous to the availability of subsidized public coverage. Controlling for offers yields results that are virtually identical to those presented in this paper. 6 We apply these rules at the family level, requiring families to spend down both assets and income. Throughout the analysis, we assume the coverage of non-SCHIP family members remains unchanged and that any out-of-pocket expenditures for non-SCHIP family members occur before those of SCHIP children (thereby avoiding complications surrounding the effect of children's coverage on the Medicaid spend-down eligibility of other family members). 7 This is approximately the same as the overall Medicaid take-up rate among children . 8 Such declines would be especially likely to the extent that uninsured children face the ''full established charge'' for care, rather than the charge net of the discounts typically obtained by public and private third-party payers. 9 Consider the case where a person shifts from coverage A to coverage B. We model medical care use as changing from the observed m A to new level m B as follows:
where c A is the observed out-of-pocket spending with coverage A, c B is the simulated out-of-pocket spending with coverage B (generally a function of m B ), and f ¼ .6 in our base-case simulation. Intuitively, increased cost sharing causes the term in brackets to become negative, leading to a reduction in m. To solve this expression for m B , we must approximate c B ( ). For instance, in the case of medically needy coverage, c MN ( ) entails paying all charges out of pocket until the medically needy threshold is reached. This approach is roughly comparable to using an ''induction factor'' of .3 (Zabinski et al. 1999) . 10 We also require that total charges exceed $100.
A small amount of care provided free of charge from public clinics or hospitals is also included in our measure of uncompensated care. 11 Authors' calculations using MEPS. See also Van-Landeghem and Brach (2003) . 12 Increased uncompensated care may also cause safety-net providers to reduce quality or ration care. Note also that increased uncompensated care might have tax revenue implications if, for instance, uncompensated care causes private premiums to rise. We experimented with calculating the associated budgetary impact due to changes in the tax subsidy for employment-related coverage (as in the case of reverse crowd-out). These effects are, however, small, and we ignore these effects for simplicity. 13 Note that although Medicaid's Disproportionate Share (DSH) program provides federal matching funds for uncompensated care provided by safety net hospitals, most states face caps on their federal DSH allotments. 14 If coverage gaps cause private insurance holders to have medically needy and uncompensated care as well, then the offsets associated with medically needy and uncompensated care costs will be even larger than those we estimate. 15 For a review of the crowd-out debate, see Davidson, Blewett, and Call (2004) . Evidence of crowdout from Medicaid is mixed, and estimates of SCHIP crowd-out appear to be imprecise and sensitive to changes in specification (Lo Sasso and Buchmueller 2004; Hudson, Selden, and Banthin 2004) . For evidence of reverse crowd-out following reductions in immigrant eligibility see Borjas (2003) . 16 We begin with the average expenditure paid by private insurance among children with private coverage. We increase this by the 13% average private insurance loading factor in the National Health Accounts (Levit et al. 2003) . We also adjust for the fact that not all (97%) of coverage is employment-related and not all (92%) employment-related premium dollars are tax subsidized (based on analysis of the 1996 MEPS). We then apply state averages for federal and state marginal tax rates to obtain estimates of the associated reduction in tax revenues. Tax data is from TAXSIM (Feenberg and Coutts 1993) . The average state and federal marginal tax rates in our sample are 4.9% and 24.7%, respectively. By using state averages we are essentially assuming that the burden of increased employer costs would be shared broadly across workers (Selden and Bernard 2004 and references therein) . Full forward-shifting is perhaps a strong assumption in the short run. Even if employers bear the incidence of such costs, however, there will be tax revenue implications associated with corporate income taxation and personal income taxes on capital gains and dividends. 17 We use earnings from all jobs as of the interview week, imputing missing values whenever necessary. 18 U.S. Census Bureau (2001) , Ku, Ullman, and Almeida (1999) and the associated database that Leighton Ku generously shared with us; Ross and Cox (2000) ; National Governors Association (2001) ; the Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation database at http:// aspe.hhs.gov/health/schip2/; individual state Internet sites; and conversations with state program administrators. Our method for adjusting by immigration status is described in Selden, Hudson, and Banthin (2004) . 20 Our simulation accounts for the lower federal matching rate of 50% on administrative costs in both SCHIP and Medicaid. 21 In principle, our sample of SCHIP enrollees might therefore contain some higher-cost Medicaid children, imparting an upward bias to our estimate of public expenditures under SCHIP. In fact, our SCHIP public expenditure estimates are very much in line with administrative data (see later text), suggesting that this is not an important problem in practice. 22 All results are in 2000 U.S. dollars. Standard errors have been corrected for the complex design of the MEPS survey. All differences discussed in the text are statistically significant at the 5% level or better, unless otherwise noted. 23 To compare our estimates with Holahan's, we assume that half of our administrative cost adjustment is reflected in the capitation rates he reports. The resulting monthly per enrollee cost in our data (before netting out premiums) is $101 per month. The capitation rates reported in Holahan are for 2002. Adjusting these rates back to 2000 using the Medical Care Consumer Price Index, the mean adjusted capitation rate (inclusive of carve-outs and reweighted by state SCHIP enrollments in fis-cal year 2000) was $106 per month. These capitation rates include the cost of infants only in selected cases, however, so that the gap may be somewhat larger than these calculations suggest.
